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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
NASH V. STATE: JURY NOTE EXPRESSING CONCERN
ABOUT MOTIVES BEHIND A JUROROR URY NOTE
EXPRESSING CONCERN ABOUT MOTIVES BEHIND A
JURORORSUMPTION OF PREJUDICE REQUIRING VOIR
DIRE SUA SPONTE.
By: Nadya Cheatham
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a note from a jury, containing
allegations that a juror would change her original voting position if it meant
she could go home earlier, did not raise a presumption of prejudice and
therefore did not require the trial judge to conduct voir dire sua sponte. Nash
v. State, 439 Md. 53, 94 A.3d 23 (2014). Additionally, the court held that the
trial judge did not abuse her discretion when she chose to release the jurors
and remind them of their duties under oath, rather than directly assuring the
impartiality of the jurors. Id. The court further held that there was no abuse
of discretion in the trial courtn when she chose to release thAllen instruction.
Id. Furthermore, the court held that the trial judgediscretion in the trial
courtn when she choiolate Maryland Rule 4-326(d). Id.
On December 17, 2009, Troy Nash (t the trial judgediscretion in the trial
courtn when she choiolate Maryland Rule 4-326(d). ind them of their duties
uꀀdays of trial, the jury spent approximately six to seven hours each day in
the courthouse. On the fourth day of trial, the judge received a note from the
jury foreman (the when she choiolate Maryland Rule 4-326(d). ind thegness
to change her original vote of e received a not“ess to change her original vote
of eme and not return. The judge immediately read the Note to counsel for
both parties and Nash subsequently moved for a mistrial.
Rather than granting the request for mistrial, the judge chose to release
the jury for the three-day weekend, advising them to return on the following
Tuesday morning to continue their deliberations. The court also issued
additional instructions to the jury to not discuss the case with anyone and to
not do any independent research relating to the case. Nash requested that the
court give a modified Allen charge, however, the court denied this request.
On September 6, 2011, the trial resumed. After approximately one hour
of deliberations, the jury found Nash guilty of first degree murder. Nash
again renewed his motion for a mistrial and stated his intent to file a motion
for a new trial. The court reserved ruling on the motion for a mistrial and
scheduled a hearing for the motion for a new trial.
On October 28, 2011, a hearing was held on Nasht to filn for a new trial,
where the court denied both the motion for mistrial and new trial. On appeal,
the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed the lower courttion for a
mistrial and scheduled a hearing for the motion for a new trial. hich the Court
of Appeals of Maryland granted.
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The Court of Appeals of Maryland began its analysis by examining the
standard of review for a motion for mistrial. Nash, 439 Md. at 66, 94 A.3d at
31. Under the abuse of discretion standard, a trial judge is given wide
discretion in making a decision, and such decision should not be overruled
simply because the appellate court would not have come to the same
conclusion. Id. at 67, 94 A.3d at 31.
The court then examined whether the trial judge had a duty to conduct
voir dire sua sponte, prior to ruling on Nashtrial judge-53 (2012)). Nash,
439 Md. 69-70, 94 A.3d at 33. When a motion for mistrial is based on juror
misconduct, a trial judge is required to conduct voir dire sua sponte in two
circumstances: (1) when the juror misconduct is egregious and raises a
presumption of prejudice, which must be rebutted before the motion can be
denied, and (2) when a relevant and material fact, regarding the juror2)
whenres, is unknown to the court and must be determined before the trial
judge has ‘sufficient information to determine whether the presumption of
prejudice attached to the alleged misconduct. Id. at 69, 94 A.3d at 32
(quoting Dillard v. State, 415 Md. 445, 457, 3 A.3d at 403, 410 (2010)).
Despite these two, limited, circumstances, Nash proposed that the court
recognize a third circumstance, in which the absence of voir dire by the trial
judge constituted reversible error for failing to receive the jurors eassurance
that they could render a fair and impartial verdict. Nash, 439 Md. at 69-70,
94 A.3d at 32-33.
The court ultimately held that the presumption of prejudice did not apply
to the case sub judice for two main reasons. Nash, 439 Md. at 76-77, 94
A.3d at 37. First, the court determined that the Note constituted “otenti
misconduct,” rather than actual misconduct. Id. at 77, 94 A.3d at 37. The
court explained that in cases where the juror misconduct has already
occurred, the trial judge is limited to the use of voir dire to attempt to cure
any prejudice that resulted from the misconduct. Id. Here, because the
Subject Juror never acted on the alleged statement, the trial judge had the
capability of preventing any prejudice from actually occurring to Nash. Id.
Second, the court found that the statement made by the Subject Juror did not
concern any of the evidence or witnesses in the case, and therefore, did not e,
e concern thaof deliberations,” as juror contact to a witness, party to the case
or third party would. Id. The court further noted that because the
presumption of prejudice did not apply, Nash carried the burden to request
voir dire to obtain assurance of impartiality from the jury. Id. at 79, 94 A.3d
at 38.
The court then addressed NashNash had carthat the trial court abused its
discretion by failing to conduct voir dire to obtain sufficient information
about the juror misconduct, prior to ruling on the motion for mistrial. Nash,
439 Md. at 80, 94 A.3d at 39. When a party moves for a mistrial based on
alleged juror misconduct, but fails to request voir dire, the trial judge must
conduct voir dire sua sponte if he or she lacks sufficient factual information
regarding the jurorfficient , which is needed to determine whether a
presumption of prejudice arises or whether a motion for mistrial should be
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denied. Id. at 84, 94 A.3d at 41. The court held that the trial judge had
sufficient facts to rule on the motion for mistrial because the few facts that
were left unresolved did not concern factual information that was ‘of central
importance to what the jury ultimately had to decide’ in deliberations. Id. at
85, 94 A.3d at 42 (quoting Johnson v. State, 423 Md. 137, 153, 31 A.3d 239,
249 (2011)).
The court then turned to Nash’s next challenge that the trial judge abused
her discretion in failing to receive assurances from the jury that the verdict
would be fair and impartial, prior to ruling on the motion for mistrial. Nash,
439 Md. at 86, 94 A.3d at 42. The court reemphasized the flexibility in the
abuse of discretion standard, which grants the trial judge a wide range of
discretion in ensuring fairness and impartiality of the jury. Id. The court
found that the trial judge had more than one h grants the dence to rule on the
motion. deliberatio, and stated that it was not the court’s job to weigh which
option is better. Id. at 86-87, 94 A.3d at 43. Additionally, the court held that
the trial judge did not abuse her discretion when she decided to release the
jurors for the weekend, with curative instructions, rather than directly
assessing the jury’s impartiality. Id. at 87, 94 A.3d at 43.
Furthermore, the court held that the trial judge did not err in denying
Nashas not founto give the jury a modified Allen charge. Nash, 439 Md. at
94, 94 A.3d at 47. The court stated that although an Allen charge had been
allowed in at least one context that was not deadlock, it did not follow that
the trial court erred when it refused to automatically apply it to yet another
context. Id. at 92-93, 94 A.3d at 46 (citing Kelly v. State, 270 Md. 139, 310
A.2d 538 (1973)). Finally, the court held that the trial judge has the ultimate
discretion in deciding whether to give an Allen charge. Id. at 94, 94 A.3d at
47.
The court further rejected Nash’s position that the trial judge violated
Maryland Rule 4-326(d), based on the judgesition that thto the jury note.
Nash, 439 Md. at 96, 94 A.3d at 48. The court determined that the trial
judge’s response, excusing the jurors for the three-day weekend and
reminding them to remain impartial, was consistent with the plain language
of the rule. Id. Furthermore, the contents of the Note “did not pose a
question from the jury regarding applicable law that required specific
clarification,” rather, the trial judge surmised the Note to be a result of juror
fatigue and frustration. Id. at 96, 94 A.3d at 48 (quoting State v. Baby, 404
Md. 220, 263, 946 A.2d 463, 488 (2008)).
The dissent argued that the trial judge should have conducted further
inquiry into the note before denying the mistrial. Nash, 439 Md. at 98, 94
A.3d at 49 (McDonald, J., dissenting). The dissent also argued that the
majoritynducted furtheiated from its previous decisions, where further
inquiry was conducted under circumstances where the juror misconduct was
not as substantial and “central to the decision-making process” as the case
sub judice. Id. at 97, 94 A.3d at 49 (McDonald, J., dissenting).
In Nash, the Court of Appeals found that a note from the jury alleging
juror misconduct was insufficient to generate any presumption of prejudice,
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and thus did not require the trial judge to conduct voir dire sua sponte.
Although Maryland courts are reluctant to grant mistrials for every allegation
of juror misconduct, practitioners should be mindful of the courts’ continual
efforts to achieve a balance between judicial economy and preserving a
defendant’s due process rights within the criminal justice system.
Interestingly, the Nash majority expressed concern that the Note was
troublesome, but still found that it was not egregious enough to prejudice the
defendant. Going forward, the court will need to offer more guidance on a
bright line rule regarding the degree of egregious juror misconduct needed to
overcome the defendant of egregious juror misconduct

